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Abstract
Geographers tend to see energy systems as intricately interwoven with society and relatively resistant to
change. We argue that there is a danger of exaggerating the permanence and stability of the energy–society
relationship. Therefore we propose a framework that is more open to instability and transformation. Using
assemblage theory, we frame the social and material landscapes of oil – carbonscapes – as having emergent
capacities for change built into their relations of exteriority. We illustrate this by discussing instabilities at
particular points within the global oil production network: extractive hot zones, energy distribution infra-
structures, and urban spaces of consumption and practice.
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I Introduction
To most geographers concerned with energy,
evidence of our dependence on fossil fuels is
everywhere. This is despite recent rapid devel-
opments in renewable energy technologies,
coal divestment campaigns, evidence of ‘peak
car’ trends, ambitious new emissions targets in
major cities and oil price volatility. According
to recent geographical and social science scho-
larship (e.g. Urry, 2013, 2014; Huber, 2013;
Watts, 2013), the political and material land-
scapes of our fossil fuel society are as robust as
ever. Much of our built environment has been
constructed around energy matrices of afford-
able and abundant petroleum, which in turn
steers and regulates energy-related behaviour.
These landscapes have certain visible and
obvious artefacts signalling the centrality of oil
to our economy and culture, such as gas sta-
tions, oil rigs, tankers, pipelines and extraction
sites. Hegemonic social and cultural artefacts
embed fossil consumption in our lives, such as
symbolism attaching car ownership to freedom
and success. This means that the barriers to low
carbon transition are not just technical or finan-
cial, they are also mind-sets and socio-cultural
practices. As Matthew Huber puts it in his
recent book Lifeblood, the main barrier to
change is ‘the cultural and political structures
of feeling that have been produced through
regimes of energy consumption’ (2013: 168,
our emphasis).
In turn, the interweaving of material, social
and cultural forms and artefacts creates solid
structures of ‘petroculture’ (Marriott and
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Minio-Paluello, 2012), ‘fossil capitalism’
(Huber, 2013; Watts, 2013), ‘carbon lock-in’
(Unruh, 2000) or ‘carbon democracy’ (Mitchell,
2011). Urry (2014: 3) suggests that energy sys-
tems and their lock-ins are ‘not subject to simple
human intervention and control’. Not all
accounts are dystopian, but in much of the geo-
graphical and social science scholarship there is
a clear tendency to stress path dependencies and
inertia that shape society’s relationship with
energy (Shove et al., in press; Bulkeley et al.,
2013, 2014; Rutherford and Coutard, 2014;
Hodson and Marvin, 2010; Bridge et al., 2013;
Calvert, 2016). Calvert (2016) suggests that in
the recent revitalization of energy geographies,
there has been a greater stress on the political,
economic, technological and cultural work done
to establish and maintain energy systems. We
argue that the stability and permanence of
society’s relationship with carbon tends to be
exaggerated.
While there are obvious structures of inertia
and permanence, the carbon–society linkage is
also characterized by rupture, unpredictability
and instability. Yet existing theoretical analyses
often employ frameworks that are embedded
in systems thinking, in which the parts are
imagined to be closely co-articulated and
co-dependent. It is worth debating whether the
popular vocabulary of ‘regimes’ and ‘lock-in’
has certain debilitating effects and whether we
should pay more attention to volatility and
change. If not, we would suggest there is a
danger that we reproduce the narrative of the
inevitability of oil that the fossil fuel industry
has carefully constructed. We will also miss
important opportunities to sharpen conceptual
frameworks in energy geography.
The aim of this article is to conceptualize the
socio-material landscapes created by fossil-
based energy systems in ways that are open to
appreciating their instabilities and identifying
windows for transformation.
We use the term ‘carbonscape’ to describe
the theoretical and conceptual concerns at hand.
Carbonscapes, then, are the spaces created by
material expressions of carbon-based energy
systems and the institutional and cultural prac-
tices attached to them. As many theorists have
alluded, carbonscapes are shaped at the inter-
section of infrastructures, technologies, the built
environment and various social, cultural and
political regimes that govern them (Rutherford
and Coutard, 2014; Huber, 2013; Urry, 2013,
2014; Mitchell, 2011; Watts, 2013). While a
common theoretical stance is to depict the co-
articulation of these elements as a coherent
totality or as a stable organic whole, we want
to theorize carbonscapes as more contingent.
Assemblage theory, which is gaining ground
in geography, provides us with a set of concep-
tual tools with which to achieve this. It promotes
an ontology that dismisses the idea of systems as
stable, organic wholes in favour of an ontology
of entities without essence that are held together
in more or less impermanent relationships. See-
ing carbonscapes as singular, coherent systems
makes it difficult to appreciate change, because
many co-dependent parts have to change at the
same time. In thinking in terms of assemblages,
however, we illustrate how carbonscapes are
composed of various interrelated parts subject
to change and destabilization through their
involvement with other assemblages. This
enables us to appreciate changes and ruptures
that may not overthrow ‘the system as a whole’,
but nevertheless represent significant change.
Our argument is organized in the following
four sections. In Section II, we discuss theore-
tical approaches to three different types of car-
bonscapes: energy production, energy
distribution infrastructure, and spaces of con-
sumption and practice; we hold that these pre-
vailing theoretical frameworks overemphasize
their permanence. In Section III, we begin con-
ceptualizing the instability of carbonscapes and
outline how concepts from assemblage theory
can be helpful. Section IV exemplifies relation-
ships between stability and change in the three
different types of carbonscapes. Section V
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concludes by reflecting on the role of instability
in our understanding of the geography of
energy.
II Geographies of stability
and change in fossil society
Several commentators have recently noted the
re-emergence of energy as a concern for geo-
graphers (Bridge et al., 2013; Calvert, 2016;
Pasqualetti and Brown, 2014; Zimmerer,
2011). There also appears to be corresponding
and relevant trends in related fields outside of
geography, such as anthropology (Boyer, 2011),
sociology and critical theory (see special issue
of Theory, Culture, & Society, 2014, vol. 5,
issue 3) and history (Kander et al., 2014). Even
though ‘energy geography’ can be considered a
distinct subfield of geography (Calvert, 2016), it
is informed by a wide range of scholarship.
Geographers have typically had much to say
about the landscapes and material artefacts
around energy and resource sectors. Energy is
also a key topic of enquiry in studies of natural
resources, political economy, cities and other
interrelated fields (Bakker and Bridge, 2006;
Calvert, 2016).
A central claim for geographers has been that
resources and energy should be understood as
interconnected networks tying together sites
and scales, e.g. through a commodity chain
framework (Bridge and Le Billon, 2013;
Bridge, 2008). In turn, debates in the literature
about material geographies of fossil society
have been concerned with all points along this
chain, including, first, spaces of extraction and
energy production (or what we will later term
‘extractive hot zones’), second, infrastructures
for energy transport and distribution and, third,
the urban spaces of consumption and practice.
What is typical about these perspectives is that
energy and resource regimes are seen as materi-
alizations of different types of power and,
despite involving tensions and contentious pol-
itics, are quite resistant to change.
First, on the spaces of extraction and energy
production: many geographical and critical
analyses have either implicitly or explicitly
been developed as a critique of the mainstream
and hegemonic ‘resource curse’ literature. Lit-
erature on ‘the curse’, dominated by economics
and political science, has seen extractive spaces
as cursed by economic and political processes at
the national scale (see for example Mehlum
et al., 2006; Humphreys et al., 2007). Geogra-
phers, anthropologists and others have argued
that the malaises of many extractive spaces are
far more complex and must be understood in
terms of both skewed distribution of costs and
benefits locally, enclave formation and spaces
of enclosure, and unequal integration with the
global political economy of oil (Haarstad,
2014b; Logan and McNeish, 2012; Bebbington
et al., 2008; Stevens and Dietsche, 2008; Kirsh-
ner and Power, 2015). Yet in broadening out the
scope and complexity of the processes underly-
ing ‘the curse’, geographers tend to deepen the
view of the grip that oil extraction has on social
development trajectories. Watts (2004), for
example, has suggested that we should be atten-
tive to how oil is ‘inserted into an already exist-
ing political landscape of forces, identities and
forms of power’ (2004: 76). Elsewhere he draws
attention to the global regime of accumulation
that envelops oil extraction (Watts, 2013).
The operative perspective in this literature is
typically that the local extraction spaces (and
their patterns of underdevelopment, inequalities
and environmental disruption) are intricately
embedded in the broader political economy:
multi-scalar complexes involving oil compa-
nies, political institutions and more. Much of
this work is quite convincing, and foreground-
ing the power structures of the global regime of
oil is an important part of its rationale. Yet in
this sense it tends to present an image of relative
stability and resistance to change, as local
dynamics are closely embedded within the glo-
balized regime. Even though the contentious
politics of social movements and civil society
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always remain part of the picture (see Bebbing-
ton et al., 2008; Perreault, 2006), the general
perspective seems to be that the hegemony of
oil capital is able to destabilize and undercut
serious challenges to continued accumulation.
Second, many geographers and social scien-
tists have looked at how the infrastructures
through which energy and resources are distrib-
uted and transported shape relations of power.
As Urry (2014), Mitchell (2009), Shove and co-
authors (in press) and others have observed,
energy infrastructures can be investigated for
how they create order and embody particular
forms of authority both through the ‘things’ that
are necessary for them to function and through
the discourses and practices that surround them.
Their accounts have recognized that power rela-
tions are embedded both in the minuscule or
‘background’ material artefacts in society, or
‘boring things’, as Star (1999) labels them, as
well as in larger machines and structures of
modern culture (Winner, 1980). Social orders
are not only a result of institutional and political
practices but also, as Winner puts it, of ‘tangible
arrangements of steel and concrete, wires and
transistors, nuts and bolts’ (Winner, 1980: 128).
By emphasizing the way inert infrastructures
steer practices, this perspective also fore-
grounds stability and resistance to change.
Mitchell’s work on ‘carbon democracy’ is
particularly instructive in showing how the dif-
ferent infrastructures in use for large-scale dis-
tribution of coal and oil have effects on political
practices. These two different types of energy
sources (coal being solid with low energy inten-
sity, oil being liquid with high energy intensity)
require very different types of infrastructure,
and these different infrastructure regimes have
had correspondingly different political effects.
Oil could be produced and transported in ways
far less conducive to pressure from organized
labour. Whereas the movement of coal tends
to follow the centric networks of rail lines, with
potential choke points at several junctures, oil
flows more like a grid, with more than one
possible path and where blockages are more
difficult (Mitchell, 2009). Similarly, Marriott
and Minio-Paluello’s description of the oil road
between the Caspian Sea and central Europe
frames large-scale infrastructure as the under-
pinning of power relationships of modern soci-
ety. These power relationships, they claim,
‘resist any shift away from this petroculture’
(Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2014: 83). These
writers are certainly interested in social and
political change. But by stressing the co-
articulation of material infrastructures and polit-
ical power, this change tends to be conditioned
upon structural shifts in the broader energy
system.
This insistence upon reading socio-political
orders out of infrastructure is suggestive of
Foucault. Indeed, these writers often employ Fou-
caultian notions of governmentality and bio-
power, again emphasizing the co-articulation of
energy-related infrastructures with socio-
political orders. For instance, Boyer (2014) pro-
poses a theoretical entanglement of Foucaultian
biopower with ‘energopower’, the harnessing
of electricity and fuel for social purposes. Stren-
gers (2013) stresses the way ‘smart’ energy tech-
nologies involve a particular discursive subject
formation around ‘energy-rational man’. In broad
terms, the Foucaultian-inspired assessment of
energy infrastructure stresses how power and
authority are built into its material and social
forms.
This is effective at revealing how both ‘big’
and ‘small’ infrastructural artefacts create and
underpin social orders and regimes. Yet it is not
easy to envision potentialities for change in
these perspectives. Biopolitical regimes are por-
trayed as inherently stable. Instability, contin-
gency and sites of contestation are difficult to
identify. Episodes of systemic disruption (such
as a blackout) are typically understood to reveal
our thorough and complete dependence on the
infrastructure system.
Third, we turn to sites of consumption and
practice, in particular how oil and energy is
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embedded in cities and urban technologies.
Energy consumption is closely related to urban
form and planning regimes (Newman and Ken-
worthy, 1989; VandeWeghe and Kennedy,
2007). Geographers have often understood cit-
ies as spatial and material expressions of partic-
ular energy regimes (Calvert, 2016; Rutherford
and Coutard, 2014). Therefore, studying cities is
a way to unpack society’s relationship with
energy. In Lifeblood, Huber (2013) examines
how petroleum has shaped recent American his-
tory and landscape, and links the rise of the new
right to the growth of a sprawling suburban
landscape conducive to individualist, entrepre-
neurial rationality. Echoing Mitchell’s (2009)
call to ‘follow the carbon’, he suggests that
energy provides an ecological foundation for a
particular privatized socio-spatial existence and
that suburban lifestyles are the spatial expres-
sion of our relationship with energy under con-
temporary capitalism. In his perspective, the
forceful agents of change seem to be the corpo-
rate interests that have managed to deeply
entangle American culture and fossil consump-
tion throughout the 20th century.
There have also been some prominent contri-
butions from geographers that have examined
cities as sites for low-carbon transitions,
approaching the work from perspectives of the
various strands of socio-technical transitions lit-
erature (Bulkeley et al., 2013, 2014). Much of
the sociotechnical transitions literature has
evolved from a foundational paper by Rip and
Kemp (1998), which takes as a starting point
that established technologies are highly inter-
twined with ‘technological regimes’ (the rule-
set embedded in practices, skills and procedures
that mediate how specific technologies are con-
ceived and introduced in society), and ‘socio-
technical landscape’ (the larger social,
economic and political system in which techno-
logical innovations arrive). A key idea is that
opportunities for change are fostered in pro-
tected niches, and that actual change depends
on how these niches interact with broader
regimes and landscapes. This basic framework
has evolved into different strands – transition
management, strategic niche management, the
multilevel perspective on sustainability transi-
tions, and technological innovation systems
(Markard et al., 2012) – that each conceptualize
relationships between stability and change in
different ways. Geels (2013) suggests that cities
can be considered such niches in which radical
innovations take place.
Geographers have critiqued the under-
theorized and unfounded spatial assumptions
of the multi-level perspective (Coenen et al.,
2012; Hansen and Coenen, 2015), but have also
suggested ways to employ spatial vocabularies
to inform perspectives on socio-technical
regimes and transitions (Bridge et al., 2013).
Rather than understanding radical transforma-
tions as arising in protected niches, geographers
are typically more concerned with the cross-
spatial and multi-scalar networks in which
radical and transformative practices are engen-
dered (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013; Haarstad,
2014a). Yet the perspective has also been used
productively in geography to theorize urban
change and transformation. Bulkeley and co-
authors (2013, 2014), for example, argue for a
perspective on socio-technical regimes that is
configured socio-spatially and structured
through processes of political economy and
political ecologies of infrastructure. They hold
that analyses of socio-technical regime change
must be understood in relation to the broader
political economy of relations that go into main-
taining and contesting urban infrastructures.
Others have combined various metabolic and
infrastructural perspectives to examine urban
socio-technical regimes and how they are con-
tested and reconfigured (McFarlane and Ruther-
ford, 2008; Pflieger et al., 2009; Hommels,
2005).
Given the multifaceted conceptual frame-
work it offers, it is understandable that so many
are now using variations of the sociotechnical
transitions literature as an inroad to analysing
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processes of change. It also has some family ties
to assemblage thinking, in the sense that ideas
around the social construction of technology
can in part be traced to Latour and actor-net-
work theory (see Rip and Kemp, 1998), which
has also stimulated assemblage thinking (Mül-
ler, 2015). But we prefer the assemblage frame-
work to the sociotechnical transitions theory for
several reasons. First, transitions theory is
oriented primarily towards incremental changes
that lead to systemic transitions over long time
(Markard et al., 2012, state that transitions typi-
cally take 50 years or more), which overlooks
the self-significance of pockets of radical
transformation. Also, transitions theory is
wedded to a systems perspective, which assem-
blage thinking attempts to break with, because
in systems thinking change only becomes sig-
nificant once it affects all the other elements in
the system. Finally, a return to political econ-
omy and infrastructure in theorization of cities
and urban low carbon transitions, which Bulke-
ley and co-authors (2013, 2014) argue for, is in
danger of pulling us back into an emphasis on
fixity and permanence. The political economy
tradition in human geography has typically
stressed how processes of capital accumulation
shape socio-spatial change and the urban condi-
tion (Harvey, 1989). So while sociotechnical
transitions literature is quite helpful in under-
standing cities as sites for low carbon transitions
and changes in the sphere of consumption, it is
not without problems. In particular, its systemic
orientation prioritizes broad and long-term
changes rather than specific ruptures and
instabilities in cities and elsewhere.
In broad terms, central perspectives on fossil-
based society tend to stress the permanence and
stability of energy regimes. The works cited
above are obviously not exhaustive, yet from
studies ranging from the spaces of oil extraction
to the distribution and transport infrastructures
to the urban spaces of consumption and prac-
tice, there is a tendency to emphasize the con-
serving and permanence-creating forces of
capital and energy materialities. Across these
different perspectives, a common thread is that
the socio-spatial embeddedness of energy sys-
tems creates path dependencies locking in
carbon-based practices. While we largely share
these observations, we have also come to think
that the stability and permanence of oil land-
scapes tend to be exaggerated. When material
infrastructures, socio-cultural artefacts and
political structures are all understood as
mutually reinforcing forces of conservation, the
opportunities for change are difficult to identify,
appreciate, and theorize. In most of the litera-
ture discussed above, a key theoretical objective
has been to explain permanence and fixity
rather than identifying the points of leverage for
change.
Therefore, there is a need to reconceptualize
the stabilities and instabilities of fossil society
in ways that are open to new pathways for
change and transformation. This should in no
way reject the significant permanence created
by the embeddedness of energy in various
aspects of society – this would obviously over-
look important historical experience. However,
if we are to understand how stabilities interact
with volatility and instabilities – which are also
important aspects of historical experience – then
we need theoretical frameworks that enable us
to identify and analyse them.
III Conceptualizing the instability
of carbonscapes
‘Carbonscapes’ are characterized both by path-
dependencies and by rupture. The notion of ‘-
scape’ plays off of landscape, a term that has a
long trajectory in energy geography and the
wider discipline (Calvert, 2016; Zimmerer,
2011). There is also a tradition of seeing land-
scapes as more than material artefacts but rather
as permeated by, or constructed through, social,
political, cultural and economic relationships
(Mitchell, 2003). As Zukin (1992: 224) has
explained, landscapes are ‘built around
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dominant social institutions [ . . . ] and ordered
by their power.’ In other words, when we use the
notion of ‘carbonscape’ to describe the relation-
ship between energy and society, there is an
explicit recognition of how social regimes and
power relations create order and inertia. The
apparent inertia of energy landscapes can be
illustrated by Table 1, which stipulates the life-
span for different types of energy infrastruc-
ture. Much of the infrastructure central to the
current form of energy production has a life-
time of more than 50 years and urban plans
potentially have centuries-long lifespans. This
material inertia may serve to uphold the social
orders that first produced the infrastructures, as
suggested by the concepts of socio-technical
regimes and carbon lock-in (Coenen et al.,
2012; Unruh, 2000).
At the same time, there is more to carbon-
scapes than inertia – volatility and change are
equally important parts of the picture. Andrew
Moore’s photographs of the dilapidated and
post-apocalyptic urban landscape of Detroit, the
former Motor City of the world and (quite liter-
ally) engine of the US economy, are a reminder
of that fact. (His book of photography, inciden-
tally, is titled Detroit Disassembled.) As another
example, the speed of technological advance
and instalment of solar PV should also be con-
sidered a rapid change in global energy systems,
having increased almost 70-fold from 2004 (2.6
gigawatts) to 2013 (177 gigawatts) (REN21,
2015). ‘Peak car’ has relatively quickly become
accepted as a real trend in the US and Europe
(Goodwin and Van Dender, 2013), contrary to
the pessimistic prognoses of writers like Urry
(2004) a decade ago. In the past few years the
discourse has shifted from discussing ‘peak oil’
(diminishing reserves) to ‘carbon bubble’ and
‘stranded assets’ (having more oil than we can
use). The petroleum economy itself is also sub-
ject to sudden jolts from unpredictable factors
such as oil price instability, geopolitical threats
to energy security, and terrorism. Everything
seems stable, until it suddenly does not.
Therefore, we have been wondering whether
language such as ‘regimes’ and ‘lock-in’ may
have certain debilitating effects. There is a dan-
ger that the resistant nature of the landscapes
made by oil are exaggerated and that the theo-
retical frameworks available are so populated
with concepts stressing inertia that instances
of change are made invisible. This is a theore-
tical problem in the sense that we fail to theorize
the relationships between stability and change
properly. It is also a normative problem in the
sense that we as theorists may reproduce the
narrative of the inevitability of oil that the oil
industry itself has so painstakingly created. The
theoretical project should instead be to concep-
tualize carbonscapes in ways that take account
of how structures of stability coexist and are
interrelated with processes of change. Our
intentions here resonate with J.K. Gibson-Gra-
ham’s (2006) project of destabilizing imagin-
aries of capitalism in ways that open spaces
for negotiation and contestation.
To suggest a way forward, we will draw
insights from theory on assemblages. Assem-
blage theory, developed by Manuel DeLanda
following Deleuze and Guattari, is a theoretical
framework in which instability and change are
characteristic features (DeLanda, 2006). This
perspective has recently gained ground in geo-
graphy, probably because it allows for the
Table 1. Expected lifetime of energy-related infra-
structure. Adapted from The Stern Review (Stern,
2007) and Wilkinson et al. (2007).
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conceptualization of the entanglements of mate-
rial, social and ideational elements (McFarlane
and Anderson, 2011). Geographers working on
energy and natural resources often use the term
‘assemblage’ casually, as Bridge and co-authors
have done when stating that ‘landscape
describes the assemblage of natural and cultural
features across a broad space and the history of
their production and interaction’ (2013: 5).
Watts (2013) draws our attention to an aspect
of what he calls the oil and gas assemblage: a
global production network with particular prop-
erties, actors, networks, governance structures,
institutions and organizations, but also a com-
plex regime of accumulation and a mode of reg-
ulation, held together by the massive global oil
infrastructure.
In a more specific theoretical sense, ‘assem-
blage’ is employed to describe constellations of
social and material, expressive and physical
components (Allen, 2011; McFarlane and
Anderson, 2011; Ogden et al., 2013; Tsing,
2005). To Sassen and Ong (2014: 19), the
‘notion of assemblage is something that helps
. . . to understand transformations and perhaps
even historical turning points’ and is a perspec-
tive that allows us to actively destabilize pow-
erful social categories. Assemblage thinking has
together with actor-network theory been in the
forefront of a revalorization of the material, or
the co-constitution between humans and non-
humans (Müller, 2015; Martinez, 2007). But
even though the material realm is often associ-
ated with structure and inertia, the time-space of
assemblages is imagined as inherently unstable
and infused with movement and change (Mar-
cus and Saka, 2006). As a contribution to geo-
graphical thought, assemblage theory can be
useful for integrating materiality, power and
scale into one single analytical framework.
Assemblages can be understood as entities
without essence. They involve relations
between both human and non-human compo-
nents, and relational work is necessary to keep
these components together. The component
parts are harbouring unexercised capacities that
might produce very different properties if the
entities were to enter into relations with other
entities. DeLanda (2006: 10–11) refers to these
relations as ‘relations of exteriority’. He argues
that we must not confuse the properties of a
particular entity with the capacities of its com-
ponent parts to form relations with other enti-
ties. Instead of seeing social entities as totalities
(organic wholes bound together by internal rela-
tions), assemblage theory stresses how the inter-
actions between seemingly separate elements
produce unstable and contingent entities,
revealing the empirical stability of carbon-
scapes as temporary, contingent achievements,
always vulnerable to reconfigurations. Ander-
son and co-authors (2012) argue that this notion
of relations of exteriority allows us to actualize
ongoing processes of composition of different
component parts, rethink social formations as
complex wholes composed through diversity;
and attend to the expressive powers of entities
(Bennett, 2005; Gidwani, 2008; Latour, 2005;
Ong, 2007). Thus, the assemblage’s only unity
is that of co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a
‘sympathy’ (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007 [1977]:
52). Rather than conceptualizing assemblages
as seamless wholes, ‘relations of exteriority’
implies certain autonomy for the elements they
relate (DeLanda, 2006: 10–11).
DeLanda characterizes socio-material
assemblages along three dimensions. First, he
distinguishes between processes that stabilize
the emergent identity of assemblages (by shar-
pening their borders, or homogenizing their
composition) from those that tend to destabilize
this identity and hence open the assemblage to
change. These are processes of territorialization
and deterritorialization, respectively (DeLanda,
2006; Deleuze and Guattari, 1988). Second, the
component parts are recognized by their emer-
gent capacities, properties that are contingent
by their interaction with other component parts.
Finally, by employing DeLanda’s notion of the
assemblage converter we can highlight the
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catalytic impact of well-placed component parts
in either transforming assemblages or ensuring
that relations and parts remain stable (Wanvik,
2014). All three dimensions underscore the
pivotal changeability and constant emergence
of assemblages, rather than their stability and
permanence.
Employing the vocabulary of assemblage
theory allows us to better conceptualize the
change and instability of carbonscapes. Instead
of understanding the interweaving material,
social and political structures or socio-
technical regimes of ‘fossil capitalism’ (Huber,
2013) as stable totalities, this vocabulary
enables us to theorize the interlinkages between
stability and change: Carbonscapes have, since
the industrial revolution, been subject to pow-
erful territorialization processes that have
embedded fossil-based infrastructures, both
materially and socially. Since the Second World
War, the suburbanization of many cities in the
Global North has put in place sprawling urban
form, in a material sense. Yet this has also
bound conceptions of freedom and wealth
together with high energy consumption, the pri-
vate car, and the larger political-institutional
and corporate structures of global oil markets.
This carbonscape assemblage is strongly terri-
torialized across a range of social and material
processes and artefacts.
At the same time, the carbonscape assem-
blage is made inherently unstable through its
relations of exteriority. It has no core, no
essence and no fixed identity holding it
together. The various elements through which
it is composed – the political-institutional struc-
tures, the global oil markets, the material infra-
structures and the socio-cultural discourses of
freedom – are themselves integrated with other
assemblages which subject them to specific
pressures. For example, there are clear indica-
tions that young people are less likely to drive
cars (‘peak car’) and researchers tie this to
changing lifestyles and attitudes, new labour
opportunities and processes of re-urbanization
(Newman and Jeff, 2011; Goodwin and Van
Dender, 2013). In other words, the carbonscape
assemblage is being deterritorialized through
its relations of exteriority with the labour mar-
ket, which in turn is changed by deindustrializa-
tion and the shift towards services (among other
things). It is likely that decreased car use among
youth will gradually change socio-cultural dis-
courses that tie the personal automobile to free-
dom. In turn, key elements that combine to form
the unity of carbonscapes are in motion, which
could potentially have deterritorializing ripple
effects across the larger assemblage.
From this perspective, transformation is not
dependent upon some future overthrow of the
‘system as a whole’. Change always occurs in
particular assemblages by way of reconfigura-
tion, adaptation and conversion. Dramatic
changes in one assemblage can destabilize other
assemblages to which it is attached. Assem-
blages can have emergent capacities for change
that are difficult to see because change is con-
tingent upon interaction with other component
parts. For example, the 2011 Fukushima nuclear
accident in Japan led to the decommissioning of
German nuclear reactors and a significant pol-
icy push to strengthen the Energiewende
towards renewable energy. This cannot be
understood without attention to the emergent
capacities in the German policy arena, such as
the long-standing popular opposition towards
nuclear energy, the long-term strength of the
Green Party and emerging public support for
sustainable energy production and consump-
tion. In this instance, we can think of the nuclear
accident as an assemblage converter that
impacted particular well-placed components in
effecting transformations across several inter-
linked assemblages. Thus, although a particular
social formation appears strong, it is always
dependent upon and embedded within other
structures and processes that have greater capa-
cities for change.
Our purpose here is not to argue for a com-
plete adoption of DeLanda’s assemblage theory
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by energy geography (that would go against the
very intention of assemblage theory). However,
moving away from theoretically constructing
near-total coherence around the elements of
‘petroculture’ (Marriott and Minio-Paluello,
2012), ‘fossil capitalism’ (Huber, 2013), ‘car-
bon democracy’ (Mitchell, 2011) or what we
have here called carbonscapes helps us theo-
rize and visualize change processes and poten-
tials. Assemblage theory can provide us with
an effective social ontology and a vocabulary
for this purpose. Drawing on this theoretical
perspective, we can summarily outline our
view on carbonscapes:
 Carbonscapes are material landscape
expressions of material and social pro-
cesses that cross-cut spatial scales and
localities.
 Carbonscapes are not coherent and inte-
grated unitary systems, but rather assem-
blages combining material and social
component parts in stable and unstable
ways. These assemblages are strongly
territorialized in some places and spatial
scales and less so in others.
 Carbonscape assemblages have emergent
capacities for change. These emergent
capacities can be difficult to identify, but
the integration of component parts in
other assemblages (such as labour mar-
kets, technology and infrastructure, geo-
politics) means that dramatic change can
be affected from the border of an
assemblage.
 Component parts of carbonscape assem-
blages can serve as assemblage conver-
ters when they happen to be well placed
to create ripple effects. Change is never
total, as totalities do not, empirically
speaking, exist.
 In addition to episodes of dramatic
change, carbonscapes undergo gradual
processes of deterritorialization when
the forces holding them together are
weakened, diverted or undermined. Phys-
ical manifestations may be abandoned,
but are more likely to be converted to
other uses.
IV Assembling and disassembling
carbonscapes
Assemblage theory is useful as a complement
to, or an organizing schematic for, geographical
insights rather than as a replacement. We find it
particularly useful to furnish the assemblage
framework with geographical notions of mate-
riality, power and scale; in fact, assemblage the-
ory needs such conceptual furnishing in order to
supply the appropriate analytical tools. Assem-
blage theory is arguably conducive to grasping
what Jessop and co-authors refer to as the
‘inherently polymorphic, multidimensional
character of sociospatial relations’ (Jessop
et al., 2008: 389). Elsewhere we draw on Allen
(2003, 2011) and Massey (1995) to show how
assemblages must be understood as multidi-
mensional and multi-scalar (Wanvik, 2014;
Wanvik and Haarstad, 2015).
For understanding carbonscapes as assem-
blages, a particularly instructive geographical
framing is that of global production networks
of oil, or the hydrocarbon value chain. This
captures how oil moves across space from the
messiness and environmental externalities of
extraction sites, through complex pipelines and
tankers, mediated by the global financial
sphere and national polities, to consumption
sites. As Bridge and others have elucidated
(Bridge, 2008; Bridge and Le Billon, 2013;
Marriott and Minio-Paluello, 2012), through
its movement across this chain, oil intervenes
and is implicated in various political–eco-
nomic struggles and landscape-forming pro-
cesses at many sites. The carbonscapes at
these sites are assembled through complex
interactions with the globally integrated oil
industry, geopolitical negotiation between
10 Progress in Human Geography
states, and multi-spatial infrastructures. Seen
as a globally integrated totality, with a close
integration of its component parts ensuring sta-
bility and coherence, the oil industry’s ability
to shape landscapes and politics seems omni-
potent and ubiquitous.
However, it is not necessary to see the global
oil industry as a coherent totality, as much of the
literature tends to do. We can instead examine
particular carbonscapes as smaller assemblages
partially integrated in other assemblages of dif-
ferent scales, in which both stability and change
are contingent upon a range of (de)territorializ-
ing processes, emergent capacities and the pres-
ence of converters. This can be exemplified by
examining three different types of carbon-
scapes: (1) the extractive hot zone, (2) oil dis-
tribution infrastructure and (3) urban sites of
consumption and practice.
1 The extractive hot zone
At the origin of the global hydrocarbon value
chain, the carbonscapes of extractive hot zones
are chaotic and disorderly; they are both liter-
ally and metaphorically built on sand. These
places are anything but stable and permanent.
For instance, witness Fort McMurray in
Alberta, Canada, and the turmoil of the boom
created by the bitumen extraction during the
past decades. High crime rates, racism, exces-
sive substance abuse, panhandling and sprawl-
ing shantytowns taint the city’s recent history
(fieldwork in Alberta, Canada, in 2014 and
2015). Explosive growth has put extraordinary
pressure on both remote indigenous commu-
nities and local authorities.
In these unpredictable circumstances, several
territorializing processes have taken place. With
their traditionally shared interest in smooth
operations of extractive industries, government
and industry make every effort to include and
integrate indigenous communities in the value
chain to enable them to take part in the positive
impacts of industrial developments (Brownsey
and Rayner, 2009). These efforts materialize
through extensive consultation processes
(Lawrence and Macklem, 2000), environmental
impact assessments (Harvey and Bice, 2014;
Morgan, 2012; O’Faircheallaigh, 2010) and
impact and benefits agreements (IBA) (Fidler,
2010). Through these processes, government
and industry comprise a joint role as assemblage
operator, managing the territorializing efforts,
maintaining and stabilizing the carbonscapes
of extractive hot zones. However, most of these
territorializing processes are delegated to indus-
try, from consultations to self-assessments of
environmental impact, to comprehensive local
content schemes of labour and service deliv-
eries, to bilateral negotiations of benefits to
local communities. Hence, the governance
regime within extractive hot zones of Alberta
is greatly dependent on corporate profits to
maintain a certain level of infrastructure and
public services (see Wanvik 2015). This makes
the governance of extractive hot zones highly
vulnerable to deterritorializing processes and
external shocks. The recent drop in global oil
prices due to geopolitical tensions and compe-
tition over regional oil hegemonies has put tens
of thousands out of work and sent government
revenues through the floor. Assemblage conver-
ters in one part of the oil assemblage (oil price,
geopolitical conflicts) on the global scale have
led to major disruptions throughout the oil pro-
duction hot zone.
From within, the material consequences of
environmental degradation and the limited,
non-renewable character of the energy resource
threaten the existence of the extractive hot zone
(Le Billon and Carter, 2012; Marsden, 2010;
Nikiforuk, 2010). Here, by exposing its desert-
like features, vast tailing ponds and huge open
wounds in the boreal forest landscape to the
world through the lenses of local and global
media (Szeman, 2012), the resource depletion
and imagery around environmental destruction
become potential assemblage converters. Like-
wise, the social implications for tens of
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thousands of indigenous communities bent on
protecting their traditional land use rights com-
prise a destabilizing factor for the industrial
activities feeding and forming the carbonscapes
of extractive hot zones (Hanson, 2012; Hoberg
and Phillips, 2011; Huseman and Short, 2012).
These different deterritorializing processes
reveal potent emergent capacities of both
human and non-human component parts within
the carbonscapes of extractive hot zones. The
fall in oil prices and subsequent dramatic lay-
offs and provincial government deficits partly
contributed to a revamping of ‘old-fashioned
political tools’, what has been termed a ‘seis-
mic shift’ in the Canadian political landscape
(Barber, 2015), in which the New Democratic
Party won elections after 40 years of conserva-
tive rule in Alberta. Whether the environmen-
tal degradation has had similarly strong
implications for emergent capacities is hard
to tell, but combined with indigenous struggles
for rights and title, we see the emergence of
stronger, more elaborate and powerful indigen-
ous rights movements with some remarkable
breakthroughs in treaty negotiations across the
Canadian Northern Territories.
2 Oil distribution infrastructures
A second way of exemplifying the instability of
carbonscapes is to look at the infrastructures
through which oil is transported and distributed
(connecting the extractive hot zone and the con-
sumption spaces). It is tempting to see the
incredible complexity and embeddedness of
networks of pipelines, rail lines, trucks and gas
stations as a testament to the stability and deep
territorialization of carbon society. Yet they are
also highly vulnerable, contested and exposed,
and thereby unstable. Consider how Putin’s ter-
ritorial ambitions in Eastern Europe and partic-
ularly Ukraine have reignited concerns about
European gas supplies and the strategic interests
of the EU and the US. The conflict exposes the
vulnerability of Europe’s energy security and
dependency on both Russian supply and the
Ukrainian territory transit infrastructure. As
Marriott and Minio-Paluello (2012) detail in
their travel book, the attempt by BP and others
to create an ‘energy corridor’ from the Caspian
Sea bypassing Russian territory has been far
from easy. As they put it, ‘‘‘energy corridor’’
implies a space of calm orderliness, whereas
in reality much of the geography covered is
scarred by repression and turbulence’ (2012: 7).
As many actors have realized, power rela-
tions can quickly shift when control is seized
of critical infrastructure junctures through
which energy and resources flow. Herod
(2000) shows this with respect to labour orga-
nization in the US and ‘lean’ production, illus-
trating how capitalist reorganization and
reterritorialization has contradictory effects on
power relations. Other examples show how
transit infrastructure developments can serve
as assemblage converters, forging new alliances
and interest coalitions between actors who are
usually divided. As Naomi Klein (2014)
describes in This Changes Everything, the resis-
tance to TransCanada’s Keystone XL pipeline
has brought together unlikely allies and mobi-
lized enormous protests in Washington, DC,
such as the so-called ‘Cowboy and Indian Alli-
ance’ of ranchers and indigenous peoples along
the pipeline route. Klein claims the struggle
against the pipeline has revived the American
environmental movement. Whether or not this
is the case, the Keystone XL project that was
once considered an accomplished deal has
become highly publicized, contested and
protracted.
Petroleum distribution infrastructures tend to
be quite permanent and stable. However, there
are significant emergent capacities for change
in the sense that they often cross disputed and
conflict-prone territories, as well as environ-
mentally sensitive areas, and are vulnerable at
choke-off points. The economic and geopoliti-
cal significance of distribution infrastructures
may enhance their permanence, but it also
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embroils them in larger assemblages where they
are exposed to shocks, e.g. the impact of the
2014 drop in oil prices on investments in oil
infrastructure projects.
3 Sites of consumption and practice
in urban contexts
Finally, carbonscapes of urban consumption
sites can also be understood as being unstable.
Cities and their suburban spaces of car-based
lifestyles are the paradigmatic image of oil
dependence and inertia (Huber, 2013). How-
ever, urban forms can also be subject to rapid
change; seemingly inert urban forms can be ret-
rofitted, converted and undermined. A range of
cities have rapidly introduced initiatives and
policies aimed at increasing urban sustainability
and liveability over the past few years. For
example, since the first major car-sharing
scheme was introduced in Zurich in 1987, it has
now been introduced in more than 1000 cities
worldwide. Similar trends exist for bus rapid
transit (BRT) systems, bike sharing, low emis-
sion zones and other policy initiatives (Global
Commission on the Economy and Climate,
2014). Policies and initiatives in particular cities
are parts of larger assemblages composed of
transnational policy arenas, cross-scalar gov-
ernance arrangements, socio-technical regimes
and global economic interlinkages. The quick
and widespread uptake of initiatives such as
BRTs and car sharing illustrate how swiftly
trends in urban policy are picked up at a variety
of sites (McCann, 2011; Wood, 2015) and how,
in turn, particular ‘hot’ policy ideas can serve as
assemblage converters in cities. While these
initiatives are not necessarily undermining
urban carbonscapes ‘as a whole’, they can be
expected to fragment, ‘splinter’ (Guy et al.,
1997) and deterritorialize the assemblages of
car-based urbanities.
Urban infrastructures are built to accommo-
date particular industries, socio-technical
regimes or lifestyles, or as Shove and co-
authors (in press) point out, in response to
changing social practice. Thus, it is not neces-
sarily the lifespan of the infrastructures per se
that influences their longevity, but rather the
extent to which the industries, socio-technical
regimes or lifestyles that support them change.
In turn, urban structures can be as unstable as
the global industrial dynamics and the socio-
technical regimes upon which they have been
built. For example, in Norway’s ‘oil city’, Sta-
vanger, large concrete bases of oil platforms
(concrete deep-water structures, or condeeps)
were in the 1980s and 1990s constructed in
close proximity to the city centre. As some of
the largest man-made structures ever built, and
visible to the city’s residents as they were towed
out to the offshore oil and gas fields, they
expressed the labour power put into their con-
struction and the position of the city in the global
industry. However, with technology acting as a
strong assemblage converter, the oil industry is
increasingly using subsea installations rather
than condeeps. In the 2000s, the wharfs at Jåttå-
vågen where the condeeps were built were con-
verted into a modern urban space with sleek
office buildings, apartments and stores, designed
according to hegemonic ideas of compactness,
walkability and public transport connectivity. A
large concrete tower from the old days of rig
construction has been left, and serves as a sym-
bolic and emotional icon of the bygone era.
This relatively rapid deterritorialization of an
oil-industrial complex and the territorialization
of a new urban consumption space was the
result of several assemblage converters (techno-
logical innovation and new industry practices)
and emergent capacities (the will to create
spaces for modern, ‘sustainable’ living). Urban
spaces are typically resistant to change, but they
may have emergent capacities for transforma-
tion and are not determined by the longevity of
infrastructures or the urban form. There are
myriad examples of how components in urban
spaces interact with larger assemblages and are
operated upon by assemblage converters. These
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assemblage converters may be new ‘hot ideas’
in urban planning discourses (McCann, 2011),
new technologies, and many other factors. The
point is that they may undermine the territoria-
lization of oil-based carbonscapes in particular
urban contexts. Table 2 presents an assemblage
analysis of the production chain of oil by ela-
borating on the examples provided in the pre-
ceding section.
V Conclusion
When exploring the social orders and regimes
surrounding oil we should pay more attention to
the volatile nature of the energy–society rela-
tionship. From the bitumen boomtowns of
extractive hot zones to the affluent urban spaces
of the Global North, the extraction, conversion,
transportation and consumption of energy are
unstable processes that we use significant
resources to contain, control and put into order.
Carbonscapes are maintained and contested
throughout the global commodity chains of oil.
Therefore, we need theoretical and conceptual
frameworks that both recognize stability and
enable us to appreciate instability and rupture.
We hold that some of the most prevalent frame-
works in operation are prone to address the iner-
tia and permanence of carbonscapes rather than
their instabilities, and in doing so may exagge-
rate their stability. Political economy frame-
works, infrastructure perspectives, biopolitics
and socio-technical regimes share an interest
in structures that are maintained and ordered
by dominant power relationships. In addition,
there is a tendency to think in terms of coherent
totality, whole systems articulated by the inter-
relation of infrastructures, institutions and prac-
tices. In thinking of carbonscapes as systems
with closely intertwined and co-dependent
parts, actual changes may be overlooked or sim-
ply dismissed as minor systemic adjustments.
Table 2. Assemblage analysis of the instabilities of the oil production chain.
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 Changing global energy
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 Sudden oil price changes
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 Sudden oil price changes
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There are certainly efforts to theorize change,
e.g. in the sociotechnical transitions literature.
Yet it remains within a systemic orientation that
prioritizes broad and long-term changes rather
than specific ruptures and instabilities.
We have argued that assemblage theory is
quite helpful in disaggregating processes of car-
bonscape stability and instability. Our intention
has not been to argue for assemblage theory per
se but rather to take advantage of certain oppor-
tunities it offers. What is particularly liberating
about the assemblage perspective is its insis-
tence on understanding socio-material entities
as lacking a coherent core, or strong internal
relations holding them together. So instead of
talking about techno-institutional complexes,
regimes, or a coherent systemic ‘fossil capital-
ism’ held together by a co-articulation of insti-
tutions, infrastructures and practices (Unruh,
2000; Huber, 2013; Urry, 2013), we can talk
about a looser association of different social and
material elements drawn together and pulled
apart by a range of different forces.
This is liberating because it frees us from the
assumption that changes need to impact the fun-
damentals of larger socio-technical regimes to be
significant. Instead, carbonscapes are always
subject to both territorializing and deterritorializ-
ing processes, simultaneously strengthening and
weakening the ability of carbon interests to order
social practices. This enables us to recognize, for
example, that while automobility has been terri-
torialized in urban and suburban spaces through
highway construction, shopping malls and socio-
cultural discourses, it has also, at least during the
past decade or so, been deterritorialized by new
initiatives of urban regeneration, new and less
car-centric cultural values, and widespread rec-
ognition of the importance of urban planning for
sustainable and liveable cities. Whether or not
this challenges the entire ‘system of automobi-
lity’ (Urry, 2004) is hard to say, but these
changes are still significant and should inform
empirical and theoretical analyses. For us, the
important point is to illustrate that carbonscapes
are fragmented, contested and converted at par-
ticular sites. So, counter to Brenner and co-
authors (2011), who suggest assemblage thinking
blunts critical sensibilities, we find that assem-
blage thinking is helpful in opening spaces for
negotiation and contestation.
Further work remains toward articulating
how the tension between stability and instability
of carbonscapes is worked out across scales,
territories, networks and places. Ongoing work
in geography debates how assemblage theory
and spatial concepts can interact fruitfully
(McFarlane and Anderson, 2011). A key theo-
retical challenge for understanding carbon-
scapes is to elaborate how stabilities and
instabilities are worked out in different contexts
and how various territorializing and deterritor-
ializing processes play out differently locally,
globally and at every scale in between (Haar-
stad, 2014a; Wanvik, 2014).
Finally, we end by returning to our introduc-
tory comment, suggesting that there is a norma-
tive rationale for shifting our attention towards
instabilities and change. We are not necessarily
suggesting that all our exemplified changes are
‘good’ in a normative sense. But destabilizing the
permanence of carbonscapes may be productive
in its own right. As noted in the introduction, the
emphasis on structural constraints runs the risk of
reproducing the oil industry’s carefully scripted
narrative of its own inevitability. Geographers
are particularly well placed to go beyond the
generalized and large-scale panorama of energy
systems in which change is primarily gradual and
longue durée. Whether we use assemblage the-
ory or some other framework conducive to
understanding instability, it is critical that the
specific lens that spatiality affords us is also used
to identify the cracks in the wall and the leverage
points for transformation.
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